Paṭhama vagga - First Chapter
1.268
“It is impossible, bhikkhus, it is inconceivable that a person |having right view::one who is accomplished in view, with correct outlook, attitude, belief [diṭṭhisampanna]| could consider any |conditioned phenomena::fabrications, concoctions, volitional formations, karmic activity [saṅkhārā]| as |permanent::stable, not in flux [nicca]|. Such a possibility does not exist. But it is possible, bhikkhus, that an |ordinary person::a common person, a worldling [puthujjana]| might consider some conditioned phenomenon as permanent. Such a possibility does exist.”
1.269
“It is impossible, bhikkhus, it is inconceivable that a person having right view could consider any conditioned phenomena as |pleasurable::pleasant, contentment, happiness, ease [sukha]|. But it is possible, bhikkhus, that an ordinary person might consider some conditioned phenomenon as pleasurable. Such a possibility does exist.”
1.270
“It is impossible, bhikkhus, it is inconceivable that a person having right view could consider any conditioned phenomena as |personal::related to oneself, self, essence [atta]|. Such a possibility does not exist. But it is possible, bhikkhus, that an ordinary person might consider some conditioned phenomenon as personal. Such a possibility does exist.”
1.271
“It is impossible, bhikkhus, it is inconceivable that a person having right view could deprive their mother of life. Such a possibility does not exist. But it is possible, bhikkhus, that an ordinary person might deprive their mother of life. Such a possibility does exist.”
1.272
“It is impossible, bhikkhus, it is inconceivable that a person having right view could deprive their father of life. Such a possibility does not exist. But it is possible, bhikkhus, that an ordinary person might deprive their father of life. Such a possibility does exist.”
1.273
“It is impossible, bhikkhus, it is inconceivable that a person having right view could deprive an |Arahant::a worthy one, an epithet of a fully awakened being [arahant]| of life. Such a possibility does not exist. But it is possible, bhikkhus, that an ordinary person might deprive an arahant of life. Such a possibility does exist.”
1.274
“It is impossible, bhikkhus, it is inconceivable that a person having right view, with a |corrupted mind::corrupted state of mind, such as having anger, being upset, or being resentful [paduṭṭhacitta]|, could cause the |Tathāgata::one who has arrived at the truth, an epithet of the Buddha [tathāgata]| to bleed. Such a possibility does not exist. But it is possible, bhikkhus, that an ordinary person with a corrupted mind might cause the Tathāgata to bleed. Such a possibility does exist.”
1.275
“It is impossible, bhikkhus, it is inconceivable that a person having right view, could |cause a schism in the Saṅgha::cause a splitting apart of the monastic community [saṅgha bhindati]|. Such a possibility does not exist. But it is possible, bhikkhus, that an ordinary person might cause a schism in the Saṅgha. Such a possibility does exist.”
1.276
“It is impossible, bhikkhus, it is inconceivable that a person having right view could acknowledge someone other [than the Buddha] as their teacher. Such a possibility does not exist. But it is possible, bhikkhus, that an ordinary person might acknowledge someone other [than the Buddha] as their teacher. Such a possibility does exist.”
1.277
“It is impossible, bhikkhus, it is inconceivable that two arahants who are perfectly Awakened Ones could arise in one world system during the same time. Such a possibility does not exist. But it is possible, bhikkhus, that one arahant who is a |perfectly Awakened One::fully awakened being, fully enlightened being [sammāsambuddha]| might arise in one world system. Such a possibility does exist.”
Dutiya vagga - Second Chapter
1.278
“It is impossible, bhikkhus, it is inconceivable that two wheel-turning monarchs could arise in one world system during the same time. Such a possibility does not exist. But it is possible, bhikkhus, that one |wheel-turning monarch::a just and virtuous ruler whose domain extends over the entire known world [rājā cakkavattī]| might arise in one world system. Such a possibility does exist.”
1.279
“It is impossible, bhikkhus, it is inconceivable that a woman could be an arahant, a fully awakened Buddha. Such a possibility does not exist. But it is possible, bhikkhus, that a man could be an arahant, a fully awakened Buddha. Such a possibility does exist.”
1.280
“It is impossible, bhikkhus, it is inconceivable, that a woman could be a wheel-turning monarch. Such a possibility does not exist. But it is possible, bhikkhus, that a man could be a wheel-turning monarch. Such a possibility does exist.”
1.281
“It is impossible, bhikkhus, it is inconceivable, that a woman could occupy the position of |Sakka::name of the king of the deities [sakka]|. Such a possibility does not exist. But it is possible, bhikkhus, that a man could occupy the position of Sakka. Such a possibility does exist.”
1.282
“It is impossible, bhikkhus, it is inconceivable, that a woman could occupy the position of |Māra::the ruler of the sensual realm, often depicted as a tempter who tries to obstruct beings from the path to liberation [māra]|. Such a possibility does not exist. But it is possible, bhikkhus, that a man could occupy the position of Māra. Such a possibility does exist.”
1.283
“It is impossible, bhikkhus, it is inconceivable, that a woman could occupy the position of |Brahmā::a deity ruling over vast world systems, sometimes mistakenly believed to be a creator god [brahmā]|. Such a possibility does not exist. But it is possible, bhikkhus, that a man could occupy the position of Brahmā. Such a possibility does exist.”
1.284
“It is impossible, bhikkhus, it is inconceivable that a wished for, desirable, or agreeable result could be produced from |bodily misconduct::killing living beings, harming others, theft, or sexual misconduct [kāyaduccarita]|. Such a possibility does not exist. But it is possible, bhikkhus, that an unwished for, undesirable, or disagreeable result could be produced from bodily misconduct. Such a possibility does exist.”
1.285
“It is impossible, bhikkhus, it is inconceivable that a wished for, desirable, or agreeable result could be produced from |verbal misconduct::false speech, harsh speech, divisive speech, idle chatter [vacīduccarita]|. Such a possibility does not exist. But it is possible, bhikkhus, that an unwished for, undesirable, or disagreeable result could be produced from verbal misconduct. Such a possibility does exist.”
1.286
“It is impossible, bhikkhus, it is inconceivable that a wished for, desirable, or agreeable result could be produced from |mental misconduct::yearning with strong eagerness and desire, having ill-will or hatred, delighting in harm|. Such a possibility does not exist. But it is possible, bhikkhus, that an unwished for, undesirable, or disagreeable result could be produced from mental misconduct. Such a possibility does exist.”
Tatiya vagga - Third Chapter
1.287
“It is impossible, bhikkhus, it is inconceivable that an unwished for, undesirable, or disagreeable result could be produced from good bodily conduct. Such a possibility does not exist. But it is possible, bhikkhus, that a wished for, desirable, or agreeable result could be produced from good bodily conduct. Such a possibility does exist.”
1.288
“It is impossible, bhikkhus, it is inconceivable that an unwished for, undesirable, or disagreeable result could be produced from |good verbal conduct::speaking at proper time, being truthful, gentle, beneficial and speaking with a mind of loving-kindness [vacīsucarita]|. Such a possibility does not exist. But it is possible, bhikkhus, that a wished for, desirable, or agreeable result could be produced from good verbal conduct. Such a possibility does exist.”
1.289
“It is impossible, bhikkhus, it is inconceivable that an unwished for, undesirable, or disagreeable result could be produced from |good mental conduct::thoughts of generosity, letting go, thoughts of non-ill-will, benevolence, thoughts of non-harm, compassion [manosucarita]|. Such a possibility does not exist. But it is possible, bhikkhus, that a wished for, desirable, or agreeable result could be produced from good mental conduct. Such a possibility does exist.”
1.290
“It is impossible, bhikkhus, it is inconceivable that one who engages in bodily misconduct, on account of that, due to that condition, after the breaking up of the body at death, could be reborn in a good destination, in a |heavenly world::a blissful realm, celestial world [sagga]|. Such a possibility does not exist. But it is possible, bhikkhus, that one who engages in bodily misconduct, on account of that, due to that condition, after the breaking up of the body at death, could be reborn in a state of loss, in a bad destination, in the lower realms, in |hell::a place of intense suffering, lit. no good fortune [niraya]|. Such a possibility does exist.”
1.291
“It is impossible, bhikkhus, it is inconceivable that one who engages in verbal misconduct, on account of that, due to that condition, after the breaking up of the body at death, could be reborn in a good destination, in a heavenly world. Such a possibility does not exist. But it is possible, bhikkhus, that one who engages in verbal misconduct, on account of that, due to that condition, after the breaking up of the body at death, could be reborn in a state of loss, in a bad destination, in the lower realms, in hell. Such a possibility does exist.”
1.292
“It is impossible, bhikkhus, it is inconceivable that one who engages in mental misconduct, on account of that, due to that condition, after the breaking up of the body at death, could be reborn in a good destination, in a heavenly world. Such a possibility does not exist. But it is possible, bhikkhus, that one who engages in mental misconduct, on account of that, due to that condition, after the breaking up of the body at death, could be reborn in a state of loss, in a bad destination, in the lower realms, in hell. Such a possibility does exist.”
1.293
“It is impossible, bhikkhus, it is inconceivable that one who engages in good bodily conduct, on account of that, due to that condition, after the breaking up of the body at death, could be reborn in a state of loss, in a bad destination, in the lower realms, in hell. Such a possibility does not exist. But it is possible, bhikkhus, that one who engages in good bodily conduct, on account of that, due to that condition, after the breaking up of the body at death, could be reborn in a good destination, in the heavenly world. Such a possibility does exist.”
1.294
“It is impossible, bhikkhus, it is inconceivable that one who engages in good verbal conduct, on account of that, due to that condition, after the breaking up of the body at death, could be reborn in a state of loss, in a bad destination, in the lower realms, in hell. Such a possibility does not exist. But it is possible, bhikkhus, that one who engages in good verbal conduct, on account of that, due to that condition, after the breaking up of the body at death, could be reborn in a good destination, in the heavenly world. Such a possibility does exist.”
1.295
“It is impossible, bhikkhus, it is inconceivable that one who engages in good mental conduct, on account of that, due to that condition, after the breaking up of the body at death, could be reborn in a state of loss, in a bad destination, in the lower realms, in hell. Such a possibility does not exist. But it is possible, bhikkhus, that one who engages in good mental conduct, on account of that, due to that condition, after the breaking up of the body at death, could be reborn in a good destination, in the heavenly world. Such a possibility does exist.”